The pursuit of strategic autonomy in a fragmenting world

Ironically, President Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs have driven both Global Majority and Western nations to seek long-term strategic autonomy.

In a nutshell

• • • • • • • • • • • Global Majority states see autonomy as an enabler of anti-colonialism
                    • Europe’s autonomy aims to limit U.S. and Chinese dependence
                    • The drive for autonomy will largely be based on pragmatism

The concept of strategic autonomy has emerged as a key term in today’s international relations, especially as the global landscape shifts toward a more multipolar configuration. At its core, strategic autonomy refers to the ability of a state – or a political entity such as the European Union – to set its own foreign policy and security priorities. It means being able to make independent decisions without external influence and having the necessary resources, both material and institutional, to implement those decisions either in cooperation with others or, when necessary, independently.

While no country can truly claim complete independence in our interconnected world, the idea of strategic autonomy serves as a practical goal. It aims to expand a nation’s flexibility and maneuverability within the limits of interdependence.

The importance of strategic autonomy

The renewed significance of strategic autonomy is closely linked to the evolving dynamics of global politics. A series of developments – United States President Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs on numerous trading partners, China’s emergence as a major economic and technological rival, Russia’s reassertion as an expansionist power and the growing activism of middle powers such as India, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia – have all contributed to a more contested and pluralistic landscape.

Relying on a single dominant patron or alliance has become increasingly precarious.

Relying on a single dominant patron or alliance has become increasingly precarious. Traditional guarantees of security and market access can no longer be taken for granted, and the volatility of recent years has underscored the fragility of dependence.

For many governments, seeking autonomy provides flexibility. Rather than committing exclusively to one bloc or one great power, states now prefer to cultivate multiple relationships with different partners, allowing them to adjust their alliances as circumstances change. India’s policy of multi-alignment, for instance, encapsulates this logic: It engages with the U.S., Russia and a range of other international partners while refusing to become subordinate to any of them.

Protecting sovereignty and national interests

For India, as well as many other countries in the Global Majority, the idea of autonomy is deeply rooted in their historical fight against colonialism and the tradition of non-alignment that shaped much of their diplomatic efforts throughout the 20th century.

In contrast, the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy stems from a different motivation: the growing belief that Europe has been overly reliant on the U.S. for security, despite its attempts to assert normative power through diplomacy and economic integration. The Russian invasion of Ukraine further exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities, both in energy dependence and in military capacity, and made the debate over autonomy far more urgent.

Another reason the idea is gaining traction is that autonomy is not just about defense or foreign policy. It also increasingly encompasses economic, technological and digital realms. Supply chain disruptions during the Covid-19 pandemic showed how vulnerable even advanced economies can be when essential goods are concentrated in distant or politically sensitive regions.

Similarly, export controls and technological competition between the U.S. and China have demonstrated how economic interdependence can be weaponized. The notion of “technological sovereignty” or “digital autonomy” has therefore become central to strategic thinking in Europe and Asia. Designing, producing and securing key technologies domestically, or within trusted networks, is now vital for national power.

However, pursuing strategic autonomy comes with its own set of challenges. It can be costly and politically complex, making it economically inefficient at times.

The Elvetic Federalism between autonomy and cohesion

The costs and trade-offs of achieving autonomy

The most obvious cost is financial. Establishing independent military and industrial capabilities, reducing dependency on external suppliers and staying prepared for autonomous operations demand substantial and ongoing investments.

For example, the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness Plan proposes investing 800 billion euros in the coming years to boost military capabilities significantly. This aligns with most EU countries, who are also NATO members, committing to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2030, up from 2.1 percent in 2025.

The same is true for technological or industrial sovereignty: Reshoring production, investing in domestic research and development, and diversifying supply chains may improve resilience but also raise costs compared to global market alternatives.

A country that prioritizes self-sufficiency may forgo the economic advantages of global integration.

The second cost is political. Autonomy may strain relations with allies who interpret it as a sign of decoupling or mistrust. European ambitions for defense independence, for example, have occasionally generated friction with the U.S., which remains the ultimate guarantor of European security through NATO.

Within the EU, the term strategic autonomy has different meanings. For France, it signifies independent power projection; for Germany, it often refers to more cooperative capacity-building; and for smaller member states, it sometimes seems like an expensive or unrealistic goal.

Domestically, pursuing autonomy may also require higher defense budgets, new taxes or subsidies to domestic industry – measures that can be unpopular or politically difficult to sustain.

There is also an opportunity cost. A country that prioritizes self-sufficiency may forgo the economic advantages of global integration. Complete independence in all sectors is neither feasible nor desirable, and an excessive emphasis on autonomy risks inefficiency or isolation.

Strategic autonomy should be calibrated selectively, focusing on genuine vulnerabilities rather than pursuing complete self-sufficiency for its own sake. Furthermore, the transition to autonomy requires time.

 

Which countries can afford strategic autonomy?

Only a handful of states possess the scale and resources needed to pursue meaningful strategic autonomy across multiple domains simultaneously. Among the advanced powers, the U.S. itself is in a league of its own. As the world’s largest economy and most powerful military actor, it enjoys strategic autonomy by default, though maintaining that autonomy in an era of relative decline and fierce competition requires increasingly greater effort and spending.

An advanced middle power like France serves as perhaps the clearest example of a country that not only advocates for but also practices autonomy. With its independent nuclear deterrent, global diplomatic network, strong defense industry and tradition of independent foreign policy, France has long maintained the ability to act without full reliance on others.

Despite its changed stance after Brexit, the United Kingdom still has considerable autonomous capabilities, supported by its military assets, global reach and defense-industrial base, although it remains closely aligned with the U.S.

The EU’s ambition for strategic autonomy represents a collective version of this aspiration. European leaders increasingly argue that the EU must become a geopolitical actor capable of defending its interests and values without excessive reliance on the U.S. The concept of “open strategic autonomy” seeks to reconcile independence with continued engagement in global trade and cooperation.

Yet the EU faces significant hurdles. Its member states vary in threat perceptions, strategic cultures and fiscal capacities. Defense industries remain fragmented, and collective decision-making is slow. Achieving true autonomy would require both major investment and deep political integration, goals that are often met with resistance from national governments wary of giving up sovereignty.

The drive for autonomy among the Global Majority

Among the large emerging powers, India holds a unique position. It clearly defines its foreign policy in terms of strategic autonomy. New Delhi partners with multiple major powers – cooperating with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining historic defense ties with Russia, and joining groups like BRICS and the Quad – while preserving the ability to act independently when needed.

Economically and demographically, India has the capacity to support such a strategy, but it still faces gaps in advanced technology, defense production and infrastructure. The journey toward achieving full autonomy is a work in progress; however, the political commitment and cultural inclination for independent action are strong.

Turkiye offers another revealing example. Over the past decade, Ankara has aimed to pursue a more independent course, balancing relations between NATO, Russia and regional powers. Its expanding defense-industrial sector and assertive regional policies demonstrate a move toward autonomy. Nevertheless, Turkiye’s ambitions also reveal the limitations faced by middle powers: economic instability and the danger of overreach.

Saudi Arabia’s recent foreign policy also shows a pursuit of strategic autonomy. Riyadh has diversified its alliances, strengthened ties with China and taken a more assertive role in the region. Its vast financial resources give it room to maneuver, but dependence on oil revenues and limited domestic industrial capacity constrain the depth of its autonomy.

Smaller or less-developed states can pursue only partial autonomy, focusing on niche sectors such as energy, food or cybersecurity. For them, full independence would be too costly and strategically unwise. They may instead seek “functional autonomy” within specific areas while maintaining alliances elsewhere.

Networked autonomy in a multipolar order

The quest for strategic autonomy is unlikely to fade. In a world marked by geopolitical rivalry and technological competition, the ability to act independently remains a central measure of state power. The challenge is pursuing autonomy intelligently: selectively, cooperatively and with awareness of its economic and political limits.

Rather than seeking isolation, many states now embrace what might be called “networked autonomy”: the capacity to act independently, when necessary, yet within flexible, diversified partnerships that mitigate costs and risks. The EU’s language of open strategic autonomy and India’s strategy of multi-alignment both exemplify this pragmatic adaptation.

 

Scenarios

Most likely: Pragmatic and tiered autonomy for the decade ahead

The aspiration for strategic autonomy becomes an almost universal policy goal, but its implementation and success vary greatly. The U.S. and China, as the dominant superpowers, will continue to operate with near-total autonomy. They will aggressively leverage economic and diplomatic strategies to shape the global environment in their favor while simultaneously working to limit each other’s actions.

The most dynamic developments will occur among the second-tier major and regional powers. Countries and formal regional blocs with significant economic scale and diplomatic capacity, such as the EU, India, Japan and Brazil, will make measurable, if uneven, progress. They will successfully diversify their trade partners, build resilient supply chains in critical sectors such as clean energy and semiconductors, and enhance their indigenous defense capabilities.

But this autonomy will be practical rather than absolute. These states will remain deeply integrated in the global economy through selective multi-alignment, avoiding intense insular-bloc politics while engaging with all sides to meet their needs.

For most smaller states, achieving meaningful strategic autonomy will remain elusive. Lacking the necessary resources, they will be pushed into a state of “pragmatic dependency,” having to make tough decisions about which patron to support or to walk a delicate line of neutrality at a high economic cost.

The global order is therefore defined by competing spheres of influence, with a flexible middle ground of states exercising varying levels of sovereignty. This outcome is most likely because it aligns with the current trajectory: The tools of strategic autonomy are being actively developed, but the structural inequalities of the international system hinder a uniform move toward full independence.

Less likely: Fragmented blocs and constrained agency

The U.S.-China rivalry intensifies dramatically, escalating beyond trade and technology into a more overt political and military confrontation that forces a hardening of global allegiances. The maneuvering space that currently allows for multi-alignment rapidly collapses, and the international system bifurcates into two distinct and less interoperable technological and economic spheres – one led by the U.S. and another by China.

In this environment, the capacity for strategic autonomy diminishes substantially for almost all actors. Medium-sized powers find their options severely limited; the economic and security costs of not choosing a side become prohibitive. The EU, for instance, would be forced to abandon its quest for strategic autonomy and fully anchor itself within the U.S.-led NATO framework. India would face immense pressure to end its balancing act, potentially compromising its hard-won diplomatic independence.

The “with us or against us” dynamic returns with a vengeance, and the ability of any state to maintain partnerships across the new Iron Curtain becomes nearly impossible.

This scenario is less likely than the tiered model because the economic and diplomatic inertia against a clean global split is immense, and most nations have a powerful incentive to resist such binary choices.

However, a major geopolitical shock, such as a crisis over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, could hasten the world toward this outcome, demonstrating that the very multipolarity enabling autonomy can also, under extreme pressure, constrict it.

Least likely: A singular and united international order

The push for strategic autonomy is reversed as a new global consensus forms. This could be sparked by a catastrophic event – such as a climate disaster, a worldwide financial collapse or even the threat of nuclear confrontation arising from the Ukraine conflict – so severe that it reveals the profound limits of national self-reliance and highlights the urgent need for coordinated multilateral action and self-preservation.

Faced with a common, borderless threat, great powers would de-escalate their rivalry, thereby reviving robust international institutions. The perceived need for costly and inefficient national solutions in areas like health security, climate technology and financial stability diminishes, replaced by a renewed confidence in shared global systems and rules-based cooperation.

The drive for strategic autonomy, which would come to be seen as a contributor to the crisis by fragmenting global efforts, begins to lose its appeal. While this scenario presents a hopeful outlook for renewed global cooperation, it is the least likely outcome in the short to medium term.

The main drivers of competition – deep mistrust between Washington and Beijing, among European capitals and Moscow, the weaponization of interdependence and the domestic political gains from nationalist rhetoric – are simply too powerful to be overcome by a sudden surge of cosmopolitan idealism within a decade’s timeframe. The forces of fragmentation currently possess far greater momentum than those of integration, making a full-scale renaissance of a cooperative order a distant possibility rather than an imminent reality.

The next decade will not see a uniform outcome for strategic autonomy. The most probable path is one of differentiation. In that context, the world is more likely to witness a complex mosaic of sovereign actors than a clean division into blocs or a return to a unipolar-led or multilateral sovereignty-pooling global community.

 

Author: Bob Savic – international trade and sanctions expert, EU trade and industry regulatory advisor, and a visiting professor of international relations at the University of Nottingham, UK.

Source: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/strategic-autonomy-3/